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We study the ineciency and computation of pure Nash equilibria in unweighted congestion games, where the
strategies of each player i are given implicitly by the binary vectors of a polytope Pi . Given these polytopes, a
strategy prole naturally corresponds to an integral vector in the aggregation polytope PN =
∑
i Pi . We identify
two general properties of the aggregation polytope PN that are sucient for our results to go through, namely
the integer decomposition property (IDP) and the box-totally dual integrality property (box-TDI). Intuitively, the
IDP is needed to decompose a load prole in PN into a respective strategy prole of the players, and box-TDI
ensures that the intersection of a polytope with an arbitrary integer box is an integral polytope. Examples of
polytopal congestion games which satisfy IDP and box-TDI include common source network congestion games,
symmetric totally unimodular congestion games, non-symmetric matroid congestion games and symmetric
matroid intersection congestion games (in particular, r -arborescences and strongly base-orderable matroids).
Our main contributions for polytopal congestion games satisfying IDP and box-TDI are as follows:
(1) We derive tight bounds on the price of stability for these games. is extends a result of Fotakis (2010)
on the price of stability for symmetric network congestion games to the larger class of polytopal
congestion games. Our bounds improve upon the ones for general polynomial congestion games
obtained by Christodoulou and Gairing (2016).
(2) We show that pure Nash equilibria can be computed in strongly polynomial time for these games. To
this aim, we generalize a recent aggregation/decomposition framework by Del Pia et al. (2017) for
symmetric totally unimodular and non-symmetric matroid congestion games, both being a special
case of our polytopal congestion games.
(3) Finally, we generalize and extend results on the computation of strong equilibria in boleneck
congestion games studied by Harks, Hoefer, Klimm and Skopalik (2013). In particular, we show that
strong equilibria can be computed eciently for symmetric totally unimodular boleneck congestion
games.
In general, our results reveal that the combination of IDP and box-TDI gives rise to an ecient approach to
compute a pure Nash equilibrium whose ineciency is beer than in general congestion games.
1 INTRODUCTION
Background and Motivation. Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative
games which have been studied intensively since their introduction by Rosenthal (1973). In a
congestion game, a (nite) set of players compete over a (nite) set of resources. Each resource
is associated with a non-negative and non-decreasing cost (or delay) function which species its
cost depending on the total number of players using it. Every player chooses a subset of resources
from a set of available resource subsets (corresponding to the player’s strategies) and experiences a
cost equal to the sum of the costs of the chosen resources. e goal of each player is to minimize
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her individual cost. Congestion games are both theoretically appealing and practically relevant.
For example, they nd their applications in network routing, resource allocation and scheduling
problems.
In a seminal paper, Rosenthal (1973) establishes the existence of pure Nash equilibria in congestion
games. He proves this result through the use of an exact potential function which assigns a value
to each strategy prole such that the dierence in potential value of any two strategy proles
corresponding to a unilateral deviation of a player is equal to the dierence in cost experienced by
that player. Rosenthal proves that every congestion game admits an exact potential function, also
known as Rosenthal’s potential. As a consequence, every best response sequence must converge
to a pure Nash equilibrium because the game is nite. Further, this shows that the set of pure
Nash equilibria corresponds to the set of local minima of Rosenthal’s potential. Especially this
correspondence has helped to shed light on several important aspects of congestion games in recent
years.
Rosenthal’s Potential: Local vs. Global Minimizers. One of the most predominant aspects that
has been studied intensively in recent years is the computational complexity of nding a pure
Nash equilibrium. In a seminal paper, Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar (2004) show that the
problem of nding a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, both for symmetric congestion games
and non-symmetric network congestion games. In particular, this suggests that a polynomial time
algorithm for nding a pure Nash equilibrium is unlikely to exist for these games. In their proof they
construct instances of non-symmetric network congestion games where any best response sequence
has exponential length. Ackermann, Ro¨glin, and Vo¨cking (2008) strengthen this result by exhibiting
instances of symmetric network congestion games for which every best response sequence (from
certain initial congurations) has exponential length. On the positive side, they prove that best
response dynamics converge in polynomial time for non-symmetric matroid congestion games,
where the available resource subsets of the players correspond to bases of a given matroid (see below
for formal denitions). e authors also show that basically this is the only class of congestion
games for which this property holds true.
Most previous works in this context focus on the analysis of decentralized dynamics to reach a
pure Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Ackermann et al. (2008); Chien and Sinclair (2007); Christodoulou
et al. (2012); Even-Dar et al. (2007); Fabrikant et al. (2004); Fotakis (2010); Ieong et al. (2005));
said dierently, these works focus on nding a local minimum of Rosenthal’s potential. Much
less is known about the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium that corresponds to a
global minimum. Fabrikant et al. (2004) use this idea to show that a pure Nash equilibrium can
be computed in polynomial time for symmetric network congestion games. e authors observe
that in this case a global minimum of Rosenthal’s potential can be computed by a reduction to a
min-cost ow problem (if all cost functions are non-decreasing). Note that this is in stark contrast
with the fact that best response dynamics might need exponential time in this case (Ackermann
et al. 2008).
Only very recently, Del Pia, Ferris, and Michini (2017) make further progress along these lines.
e authors consider congestion games where the strategy sets of the players are given implicitly
by a polyhedral description (see also (Chan and Jiang 2016)). More precisely, for each player i the
incidence vectors of the strategies are dened as the binary vectors in a polytope Pi = {x : Aix ≤ bi },
whereAi is an integral matrix and bi is an integral vector. ey (mostly) focus on the case where the
matrix Ai is totally unimodular (see below for formal denitions) and thus the describing polytope
Pi is integral (i.e., all its extreme points are integral); they term these games totally unimodular (TU)
congestion games. For symmetric TU congestion games (when all Ai ,bi are identical), they devise
an aggregation/decomposition framework that reduces the problem of nding a global minimum
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of Rosenthal’s potential to an integer linear programming problem. Using this framework, they
show that pure Nash equilibria can be computed eciently for symmetric TU congestion games.
e authors also show that this problem is PLS-complete for non-symmetric TU congestion games.
Further, they show that their framework can be adapted to the case of non-symmetric matroid
congestion games.
Another important aspect that has has been the subject of intensive research in recent years is the
ineciency of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games (see, e.g., Aland et al. (2011); Awerbuch et al.
(2005); Caragiannis et al. (2006); Christodoulou and Gairing (2016); Christodoulou and Koutsoupias
(2005); de Jong et al. (2016); Feldman et al. (2016); Fotakis (2010); Gairing et al. (2008); Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou (1999); Lu¨cking et al. (2008); Roughgarden (2015)). Here the goal is to assess
the social cost (dened as the sum of the costs of the players) of a pure Nash equilibrium relative
to an optimal outcome. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) introduced the price of anarchy as
the ratio between the worst social cost of a Nash equilibrium and the social cost of an optimum.
Anshelevich et al. (2004) dened the price of stability as the ratio between the best social cost of a
Nash equilibrium and the social cost of an optimum.
Fotakis (2010) reveals an intriguing connection between the price of stability of network con-
gestion games and the price of anarchy of their non-atomic counterparts. More specically, he
shows that for symmetric network congestion games the ratio between the social cost of a global
minimum of Rosenthal’s potential and the social cost of a social optimum is at most ρ (D), where
ρ (D) is a tight bound on the price of anarchy for non-atomic network congestion games with
latency functions in class D introduced by Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses (2004). In particular,
this implies that the price of stability of symmetric network congestion games with cost functions
in D is at most ρ (D). For example, this parameter equals 4/3 for the class of ane functions and
(27 + 6
√
3)/23 ≈ 1.63 for quadratic functions. ese type of bounds fall within Roughgarden’s
smoothness framework (Roughgarden 2015).
Our Contributions. In light of the discussion above a natural question that arises, and which we
sele in this paper, is:
Which structural properties of the strategy sets of the players are sucient to
(A) eciently compute a global minimum of Rosenthal’s potential, and
(B) bound the ineciency of the resulting pure Nash equilibrium?
In order to tackle this question, we use a polyhedral approach similar to the ones by Chan and
Jiang (2016) and Del Pia et al. (2017). But in contrast to these works, we do not restrict our aention
to polyhedral descriptions arising from totally unimodular matrices only. Instead, we identify more
general polyhedral properties of the describing systems that are sucient to achieve (A) and (B).
Our main contribution in this paper is to unify and extend the results in (Del Pia et al. 2017; Fotakis
2010) to a much larger class of polytopal congestion games.
More specically, we consider polytopal congestion games in which the incidence vectors of the
strategies of player i are given by the binary vectors in a polytope Pi = {x : Ax ≤ bi }, where A
is an integral matrix and bi is an integral vector. Given the polytopes of all players, a strategy
prole naturally corresponds to an integral vector in the aggregation polytope PN =
∑
i Pi . We
identify two general properties of the aggregation polytope PN which are sucient for our results
to go through, namely the integer decomposition property (IDP) and the box-totally dual integrality
property (box-TDI) (formal denitions are given below). e integer decomposition property is
needed to decompose a load prole in PN to a respective strategy prole of the players. Intuitively,
the box-TDI property ensures that the intersection of a polytope with an arbitrary integer box is
an integral polytope.
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Our main contributions for polytopal congestion games are as follows:
(1) We generalize the upper bound of ρ (D) on the price of stability for symmetric network
congestion games by Fotakis (2010) to the much larger class of polytopal congestion games
satisfying IDP and box-TDI (Section 4). To this aim, we introduce a novel property, which
we term the symmetric dierence decomposition property, and show that it is satised by
our polytopal congestion games. By exploiting this property, we can generalize the proof
by Fotakis (2010) to these games. We also prove that our bounds are tight for these games.
(2) We provide a framework to derive an ecient algorithm for computing a feasible load
prole minimizing Rosenthal’s potential for polytopal congestion games satisfying IDP and
box-TDI (Section 5). e time complexity of this algorithm is polynomial in the number
of players and resources, the largest entry in ∑i bi and the complexity of a separation
oracle for the aggregation polytope. is generalizes the framework of Del Pia et al. (2017)
for symmetric TU congestion games and non-symmetric matroid congestion games, both
being special cases of our polytopal congestion games.
(3) We give a series of examples of combinatorial polytopal congestion games satisfying IDP
and box-TDI (Section 6). ese examples include the symmetric TU congestion games
by Del Pia et al. (2017), common source network congestion games, symmetric matroid
intersection congestion games (in particular, r -arborescences and strongly base-orderable
matroids) and non-symmetric matroid congestion games.
(4) We show that the integer decomposition property and box-total dual integrality can be used
to generalize and extend some results on the computation of strong equilibria in boleneck
congestion games studied by Harks, Hoefer, Klimm, and Skopalik (2013) (Section 7). In
particular, we obtain the new result that strong equilibria can be computed in strongly
polynomial time for symmetric totally unimodular boleneck congestion games.
Further Implications and Signicance. To the best of our knowledge, all previous works addressed
either (A) or (B), but not both. Note that the combination of (A) and (B) provides an ecient
algorithm for the computation of a pure Nash equilibrium that comes with a provable ineciency
guarantee. Said dierently, our contributions (1) and (2) can be seen as an ecient equilibrium
selection procedure to nd a pure Nash equilibrium whose social cost is at most ρ (D) times the
optimal social cost. By exploiting contribution (1), we obtain new bounds on the price of stability
which improve upon the ones for general polynomial congestion games: Christodoulou and Gairing
(2016) derive tight bounds on the price of stability of congestion games with polynomial cost
functions of maximum degree d , which grow like d + 1. However, for the class Dd of polynomial
functions of maximum degree d , we have ρ (Dd ) ≈ d/ log(d ) for large d (see, e.g., (Feldman et al.
2016)), which is a signicant improvement over the general case. Also, ρ (D) is well-understood for
various classes of delay functions D; for example, a closed form expression is known for ρ (Dd )
(see preliminaries).
Our upper bound of ρ (D) on the price of stability is (asymptotically) tight, even for symmetric
singleton congestion games with the class of delay functions D containing all constant functions
and being closed under dilations (see below for formal denitions). Note that singleton congestion
games constitute a special case of all polytopal congestion games mentioned in (3). In particular,
our results sele the exact price of stability for these applications.
Our results also reveal that the price of stability for matroid congestion games is much more
well-behaved than the price of anarchy. de Jong et al. (2016) show that for symmetric k-uniform
matroid congestion games with ane cost functions, the price of anarchy lies strictly between 4/3
and 28/13 ≈ 2.15. Obtaining a tight bound for this case seems (highly) non-trivial. In contrast,
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for the price of stability we provide tight bounds for arbitrary non-symmetric matroid congestion
games with arbitrary cost functions.
Our framework in (2) unies and extends the aggregation/decomposition framework of Del Pia
et al. (2017). In particular, the symmetric TU congestion games and non-symmetric matroid
congestion games (considered separately in (Del Pia et al. 2017)) fall into our class of polytopal
congestion games satisfying IDP and box-TDI. Similarly, all combinatorial TU congestion games (i.e.,
network, matching, edge cover, vertex cover and stable set congestion games) and their respective
extensions to the maximum (or minimum) cardinality versions in (Del Pia et al. 2017) can be handled
by our framework.
Contribution (2) can also be regarded as a “black-box” approach for the computation of a pure
Nash equilibrium. Given a congestion game that exhibits some combinatorial structure, checking
whether our approach applies reduces to the following three tasks: (i) derive a polytopal description
Pi for the strategy set of each player i , (ii) verify whether the resulting aggregation polytope PN
satises the IDP, (iii) check that the system describing the aggregation polytope PN is box-TDI. In
particular, if the integer decomposition of PN can be done in polynomial time, then this approach
provides an ecient algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium. By exploiting this idea, we
derive strongly polynomial time algorithms for the computation of Rosenthal’s potential minimum
for all applications mentioned in (3).
It is interesting to note that the IDP seems to be the limiting property for our approach to apply.
For example, non-symmetric network congestion games can naturally be modeled as polytopal
congestion games satisfying box-TDI. But it is easy to see that the IDP does not hold. In fact, it is
unlikely that an ecient algorithm to nd a pure Nash equilibrium exists because this problem is
PLS-complete (Fabrikant et al. 2004).
2 PRELIMINARIES
Congestion Games and Rosenthal’s Potential. A congestion game Γ is given by a tuple
(N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ), where N = [n] is a nite set of players, E = [m] is a nite set of re-
sources (or facilities), Si ⊆ 2E is a set of strategies of player i ∈ N , and ce : R≥0 → R is a
cost function of resource e ∈ E. Unless stated otherwise, the cost functions are assumed to be
non-negative and non-decreasing. For a strategy prole s = (s1, . . . , sn ) ∈ ×iSi , we dene xe
as the number of players using resource e , i.e., xe = xe (s ) = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ si }|. We call x the
load prole corresponding to strategy prole s . e cost of player i ∈ N under a strategy prole
s = (s1, . . . , sn ) ∈ ×iSi is given by Ci (s ) = ∑e ∈si ce (xe ). If Si = Sj for all i, j ∈ N , the game is
called symmetric. e social cost C (s ) of a strategy prole refers to the sum of the players’ individual
costs, i.e., C (s ) = ∑i Ci (s ).
We say that Φ : ×iSi → R is an exact potential function for a congestion game Γ if for every
strategy prole s ∈ ×iSi , for every player i ∈ N and every unilateral deviation s ′i ∈ Si of i it holds:
Φ(s ) − Φ(s−i , s ′i ) = Ci (s ) − Ci (s−i , s ′i ). Rosenthal (1973) shows that Φ(s ) =
∑
e ∈E
∑xe
k=1 ce (k ) is an
exact potential. Subsequently, we refer to this potential function simply as Rosenthal’s potential.
Further, a strategy prole minimizing Rosenthal’s potential is said to be a Rosenthal minimizer.
Ineciency of equilibria. A strategy prole s is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N it
holds that Ci (s ) ≤ Ci (s ′i , s−i ) for all s ′i ∈ Si . Further, a strategy prole s is a strong equilibrium if
for every group of players I ⊆ N and every deviation s ′I ∈ ×i ∈ISi of the players in I , it holds that
Ci (s ) ≤ Ci (s ′I , s−I ) for some i ∈ I .
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e price of anarchy (POA) and the price of stability (POS) of a game Γ are dened as
POA(Γ) = maxs ∈NEC (s )mins∗∈×i Si C (s∗)
and POS(Γ) = mins ∈NEC (s )mins∗∈×i Si C (s∗)
,
where NE denotes the set of all Nash equilibria of Γ. For a collection of games H we dene
POA(H ) = supΓ∈H POA(Γ) and POS(H ) = supΓ∈H POS(Γ). ese notions naturally generalize to
the solution concept of strong equilibria.
Smoothness parameter. Correa et al. (2004) show that for non-atomic network congestion games
with latency functions in class D the price of anarchy of an instance is at most
ρ (D) := (1 − β (D))−1, where β (D) = sup
d ∈D
sup
x,y∈R:x ≥y>0
y (d (x ) − d (y))
xd (x )
. (1)
e value of ρ (D) is well-understood for many important classes of latency functions. For example,
let Dd = {д : R≥0 → R≥0 : д(µx ) ≥ µdд(x ) ∀µ ∈ [0, 1]}. In particular, Dd contains all polynomial
latency functions with non-negative coecients and maximum degree d . We have ρ (Dd ) =
(1 − d
(d+1) (d+1)/d )
−1. e parameter ρ (D) plays a crucial role in bounding the price of stability of
our congestion games.
Integral polytopes. We review some basic denitions and results from polyhedral combinatorics
which are used in this paper. A polytope P ⊆ Rm is the convex hull of a nite set of vectors in Rm .
We say that P is integral if all its extreme points are integral vectors. P is said to be box-integral if
the intersection of P with any integral box, i.e., P ∩ {x : c ≤ x ≤ d } for arbitrary integral c and d ,
yields an integral polytope.
A matrix A ∈ Qr×m is totally unimodular (TUM) if the determinant of each square submatrix of
A is in {0,±1}. In particular, each entry of a totally unimodular matrix is in {0,±1}. If A is totally
unimodular and b ∈ Zm is an integer vector, then the polyhedron P = {x : Ax ≤ b} is integral
(Schrijver 1986, eorem 19.1).
Edmonds and Giles (1977) introduced the powerful notion of total dual integrality. A rational
system Ax ≤ b with A ∈ Qr×m and b ∈ Qr is totally dual integral (TDI) if for every integral
c ∈ Zm , the dual of minimizing cTx over Ax ≤ b, i.e., max{yTb : y ≥ 0, yTA = cT}, has an integer
optimum solution y, if it is nite. If Ax ≤ b is a TDI-system and b is integral, then the polyhedron
P = {x : Ax ≤ b} is integral (Schrijver 1986, Corollary 22.1c). Note that TDI is a weaker sucient
condition for the integrality of P than TUM.
e system Ax ≤ b is box-totally dual integral (box-TDI) if the system Ax ≤ b, l ≤ x ≤ u is TDI
for all rational vectors l and u. We say that a polytope P is box-TDI, if it can be described by a
box-TDI system. If P has some box-TDI describing system, then every TDI-system describing P
is also box-TDI (Schrijver 1986, eorem 22.8). We will use the following properties of box-TDI
descriptions:
Proposition 2.1. (Schrijver 1986, Section 22.5) e following statements are equivalent:
(i) e system Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0 is box-TDI.
(ii) e system Ax + µ = b, µ ≥ 0, x ≥ 0 is box-TDI.
(iii) e system Ax ≤ αb, x ≥ 0 is box-TDI for all α ≥ 0.
(iv) e system aζ0 +Ax ≤ b is box-TDI, where a is a column of A and ζ0 is a new variable.
Moreover, if a polytope P is box-integral, then every edge of P is in the direction of a {0,±1}-vector.
For our computational results we need the notion of a separation oracle. Let P ∈ Rm be a
polytope dened by a nite set of rational inequalities. Given a vector y ∈ Qn , we assume that
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there is a separation oracle that decides whether y ∈ P or not, and in the laer case it returns a
vector a ∈ Qn such that aTx < aTy for all x ∈ P . All applications that we consider in this paper are
known to have ecient separation oracles. Finally, for a vector y ∈ Qr we dene the size of y as
size(y) = max{log(yi ) + 1 : i = 1, . . . , r }.
Matroids. We introduce some general terminology and facts for matroids (an extensive treaty
of matroids can be found, e.g., in (Schrijver 2003)). Let E be a nite set of elements and I ⊆ 2E
be a collection of subsets of E (called independent sets). e pairM = (E,I) is a matroid if the
following three properties hold: (1) ∅ ∈ I, (2) if A ∈ I and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ I, (3) if A,B ∈ I
and |A| > |B |, then there exists an a ∈ A \ B such that B + a ∈ I. An independent set B ∈ I of
maximum size is called a basis. We use B to denote the set of all bases ofM. e matroidM also
has a rank function r : 2E → {1, . . . , |E |} which maps every subset A ⊆ E to the cardinality of the
largest independent set contained in A.
e base matroid polytope is given by
PM = {x : x (A) ≤ r (A) ∀A ⊂ E, x (E) = r (E), x ≥ 0},
where x (A) = ∑a∈A xa for all A ⊆ E. It is the convex hull of the incidence vectors of the bases in B
(Schrijver 2003). If in the description above the equality x (E) = r (E) is replaced by x (E) ≤ r (E),
we obtain the independent set polytope which is the convex hull of the incidence vectors of the
independent sets.
We assume that the matroid is given by an independence oracle that takes as input a subset
A ⊆ 2E and returns whether or not A ∈ I. Given an independence oracle, we can determine in time
polynomial in |E | and the complexity of the oracle, whether a set is a basis and what the rank of a
set is. Further, there exists a separation oracle for PM that runs in time polynomial in |E | and the
complexity of an independence oracle. is follows from the fact that the most violated inequality
problem can be solved in time polynomial in |E | and the complexity of an independence oracle.
e most violated inequality problem takes as input a vector x ∈ Qm and returns whether or not
x ∈ P , and if not, it returns a subset A for which r (A) − x (A) is minimized, see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003,
Section 40.3).
Given two matroidsM1 andM2 on a common ground set E, the polytope
PM1,M2 = {x : x (A) ≤ ri (A) ∀A ⊂ E, x (E) = ri (E) for i = 1, 2, x ≥ 0} (2)
is the convex hull of the common bases of matroidsM1 andM2, see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003, Corollary
41.12d). It follows directly that PM1,M2 also has a separation oracle which runs in time polynomial
in |E | and the complexity of the independence oracles forM1 andM2.
3 POLYTOPAL CONGESTION GAMES
We consider polytopal congestion games Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ) with N = [n] and E = [m],
where the set of strategies Si of each player i ∈ N is given implicitly by a polytopal representation.
More precisely, let Xi be the nite set of all incidence vectors of the strategies of player i , i.e.,
Xi = {χi ∈ {0, 1}m : χie = 1 i e ∈ si for si ∈ Si }. e polytope Pi representing the strategies of
player i is dened as the convex hull of Xi , i.e., Pi = conv(Xi ) ⊆ [0, 1]m . We assume that Pi is
given by Pi = {x : Ax ≤ bi } ⊆ [0, 1]m , where A ∈ Zr×m is an integral r ×m-matrix and bi ∈ Zr is
an integral vector. Note that Xi = Pi ∩ {0, 1}m . For notational convenience, we subsequently use
Si also to refer to the set of incidence vectors Xi ; no confusion shall arise.
We say that (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) is the polytopal tuple given by P1, . . . , Pn , where Si = Pi ∩ {0, 1}m .
Moreover, we dene PN = {y : Ay ≤ ∑i bi } ⊆ Rm to be the aggregation polytope of the tuple.
If bi = bj = b for all i, j ∈ N , the tuple is called symmetric and denoted by (N ,E,S) where
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S = P ∩ {0, 1}m , with P = {x : Ax ≤ b}. If additionally we equip the tuple with cost functions
(ce )e ∈E , we call Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ) the polytopal congestion game given by P1, . . . , Pn .
3.1 Aggregation Polytope: IDP and box-TDI
We identify two crucial properties that the aggregation polytope PN has to satisfy for our results to
go through:
(1) PN satises the integer decomposition property (IDP).
(2) e system Ay ≤ ∑i bi describing PN is box-totally dual integral (box-TDI).
e aggregation polytope PN = {y : Ay ≤ ∑i bi } ⊆ Rm has the integer decomposition property
(IDP) if every integral z ∈ PN can be wrien as z = ∑ni=1 zi , where zi ∈ Pi ∩Zm for all i = 1, . . . ,n.1
We next introduce the notion of a feasible load prole. Given a tuple (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ), a load prole
y ∈ Nm is said to be feasible for (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) if there exists a strategy prole s = (s1, . . . , sn ) ∈
×iSi such that y is the load prole corresponding to s , i.e., ye = xe (s ) for all e ∈ E. We omit the
explicit reference to the tuple if it is clear from the context.
e IDP is crucial to establish a correspondence between feasible load proles for (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N )
and the integral vectors in PN .
Proposition 3.1. If the aggregation polytope PN of a polytopal tuple (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) has the IDP,
then the feasible load proles of the tuple correspond precisely to the integral vectors in PN .
Proof. Let s = (s1, . . . , sn ) ∈ ×iSi be a strategy prole and let x be the load prole corresponding
to s . It follows directly that x ∈ PN by denition of PN . Moreover, any integral vector z in PN
can be decomposed as z = ∑ni=1 zi where zi ∈ Pi ∩ Zm for all i = 1, . . . ,n. is implies that for
every i the vector zi is the incidence vector of some strategy of player i and thus z is a feasible load
prole. 
e main reason as to why box-TDI is useful, is that it serves as a sucient condition to show
that the polytope it describes is box-integral.
Proposition 3.2. If the system Ax ≤ b describing a polytope P is box-TDI and b is integral, then P
is box-integral.
Proof. By assumption, the describing system Ax ≤ b of P is box-TDI. us the system Ax ≤
b, l ≤ y ≤ u is TDI for all rational vectors l and u. In particular, Ax ≤ b, c ≤ y ≤ d is TDI for
arbitrary integral vectors c and d . Because b, c and d are integral, we can conclude that the polytope
P ∩ {y : c ≤ y ≤ d } is integral (see, e.g., (Schrijver 1986, Corollary 22.1c)). 
It seems that most 0/1-polytopes for which the integer decomposition property is known in the
literature, also have a box-TDI describing system. We do not know if this is true in general, but it
would imply that the box-TDI assumption is redundant in all our statements below.
4 PRICE OF STABILITY
We rst introduce the symmetric dierence decomposition property. is property is crucial to derive
the bound on the price of stability.
1Note that in the symmetric case (bi = bj for all i, j ∈ N ) this denition reduces to the integer decomposition property for
a polytope PN = nP as introduced by Baum and Troer (1978).
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4.1 Symmetric Dierence Decomposition Property
Denition 4.1 (Symmetric dierence decomposition). A tuple (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) satises the symmetric
dierence decomposition property (SDD) if for all feasible load proles f and д, there exist vectors
a1, . . . ,aq ∈ {0,±1}m such that д − f = ∑qk=1 ak , and, for all k = 1, . . . ,q, the load prole f + ak is
feasible and ak satises
ake = −1 ⇒ fe − дe > 0 and ake = 1 ⇒ fe − дe < 0. (3)
As an example, let us consider symmetric network congestion games, where the common strategy
set of all players is the set of all directed simple s, t-paths in some directed graph G = (V ,A) with
s, t ∈ V . Here each feasible load prole corresponds to an integral feasible s, t-ows of value
n = |N |. e symmetric dierence of two ows f and д can be wrien as the sum of unit circuit
ows on cycles.2 e incidence vectors of these unit circuit ows correspond to the vectors ak in
Denition 4.1.
e following theorem establishes the symmetric dierence decomposition property.
Theorem 4.2. Let (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) be a polytopal tuple given by P1, . . . , Pn and let PN be the
corresponding aggregation polytope. If PN satises the IDP and has a box-TDI description, then the
tuple has the symmetric dierence decomposition property.
Proof. We start by adding slack-variables to the system Ay ≤ ∑i ∈N bi describing PN . Note that
by Proposition 2.1 (ii) box-TDI is preserved under adding slack variables. As a result, we obtain the
polytope
QN = {(y, µ ) : Ay + µ = ∑i bi , µ ≥ 0, y ≥ 0}
for which its describing system is box-TDI. Also, QN is integral.
Let f and д be two feasible load proles with f , д. By Proposition 3.1, we have f ,д ∈ PN .
erefore, there are non-negative integral slack vectors τ ,σ such that ( f ,τ ), (д,σ ) ∈ QN . Let
f ′ = ( f ,τ ) and д′ = (д,σ ). Observe that τ and σ are integral because of the integrality of A, ∑i bi
and f and д, respectively.
Note that the pairs f ′ = ( f ,τ ) and д′ = (д,σ ) are vectors in Zm+r since A is an r ×m-matrix. Let
c,d ∈ Zm+r be vectors dened by c j = min{ f ′j ,д′j } and dj = max{ f ′j ,д′j } for j = 1, . . . , r +m, and
let B be the integral box dened by B = {z : c ≤ z ≤ d } ⊆ Rm+r .
Lemma 4.3. e polytope QN ∩ B is integral and every edge of QN ∩ B is in the direction of a
{0,±1}-vector.
Proof. e integrality follows from box-TDI of the integral system QN . For the second part of
the claim, we rst show thatQN ∩B is box-integral. Note thatQN is box-integral by Proposition 3.2.
Let B′ = {x : γ ≤ x ≤ δ } ∈ Zm+r be an arbitrary integral box. Note that (QN ∩B)∩B′ = QN ∩(B∩B′)
and that B ∩ B′ is again an integral box, since B is integral as well (because f ′ and д′ are integral).
It follows that QN ∩ (B ∩ B′) is an integral polytope. us, (QN ∩ B) ∩ B′ is integral which proves
that QN ∩ B is box-integral. e claim now follows from Proposition 2.1. 
Note that f ′,д′ ∈ QN ∩ B. Further, both f ′ and д′ are extreme points of this polytope because
they are extreme points of the box B. We now x some edge of QN ∩B containing f ′. Such an edge
must exist because QN ∩B contains at least two elements (since f ′ , д′). Let (a1)′ = (a1, µ1) be the
non-zero {0,±1}-vector describing the direction of the edge.3 Since QN ∩ B is an integral polytope
we can show that f ′ + (a1)′ ∈ QN ∩ B. To see this, let h(λ) = f ′ + λ · (a1)′ be a parametrization of
2A unit circuit ow is a {0, ±1}-ow that satises ow-conservation at every node, including s and t .
3Here, µ1 corresponds to the slack variables, and a1 to the original variables.
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the edge for some range 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ∗, where h′ = h(λ∗) is the other extreme point of the edge (a1)′.
Since f ′ is integral and (a1)′ a {0,±1}-vector, it must be that λ∗ is a strictly positive integer.
We have shown that f ′ + (a1)′ ∈ QN ∩ B. It follows that A( f + a1) + (τ + µ1) = ∑i ∈N bi . us,
Aa1 + µ1 = 0 because Af + τ = ∑i ∈N bi . Moreover, by construction of the box B it follows that
(a1)′j = −1 ⇒ f ′j − д′j > 0 and (a1)′j = 1 ⇒ д′j − f ′j > 0 (4)
for j = 1, . . . , r +m. Using the fact that Aa1 + µ1 = 0, it now also follows that д′ − (a1)′j ∈ QN ∩ B.
To see this, note that A(д − a1) + (σ − µ1) = Aд + σ − (Aa1 + µ1) = ∑i ∈N bi + 0. Moreover, we also
have д′ − (a1)′ ≥ 0 by construction, since if (a1)′j = 1 for some j then д′j > f ′j ≥ 0, so in particular
д′j − 1 ≥ 0 (because of the integrality of д′j ).
We can now apply the same argument to the vectors f ′ and д′ − (a1)′ in order to obtain a vector
(a2)′ satisfying (4) and for which f ′ + (a2)′, д′ − (a1)′ − (a2)′ ∈ QN . Repeating this procedure we
nd vectors (a1)′, . . . , (aq )′ satisfying (4), and such that д′ − f ′ = ∑qk=1 (ak )′ with f ′ + (ak )′ ∈ QN
for k = 1, . . . ,q.4
We argue that this process terminates. For the K-th step of this procedure, we have by construc-
tion of the (ak )′,
T (K ) =

 *,д′ −
K∑
k=1
(ak )′+- − f ′

1 <

 *,д′ −
K−1∑
k=1
(ak )′+- − f ′

1 = T (K − 1)
where | | · | |1 is the L1-norm. Since f ′,д′ and the ak are all integral this guarantees that the expression
T (K ) decreases by at least one in every step.
We conclude the proof by showing that f and д can be decomposed according to Denition 4.1.
We have (ak )′ = (ak , µk ) as dened before. It then follows that a1, . . . ,aq are vectors satisfying (3)
such that д− f = ∑qk=1 ak with f +ak ∈ PN for k = 1, . . . ,q. Note that ak might be the zero-vector,
if (ak )′ only contained non-zero elements in the part of the vector corresponding to slack variables.
ese ak can be le out. It remains to show that f + ak corresponds to a feasible strategy prole
for k = 1, . . . ,q. is follows directly from the fact that PN has the IDP. e decomposition yields
the strategies of the players. 
For symmetric polytopal tuples with common polytope P , we have PN = nP = {y : y/n ∈ P }.
e laer polytope has a box-TDI description if and only if P has a box-TDI description, which
follows from Proposition 2.1 (iii). is yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Let (N ,E,S) be a symmetric polytopal tuple given by P . If P satises the IDP and
has a box-TDI description, then the tuple has the symmetric dierence decomposition property.
4.2 Upper bound for price of stability
e following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.5 (price of stability). Let Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ) be a congestion game with
cost functions in class D. Suppose that the tuple (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) satises the symmetric dierence
decomposition property. en POS(Γ) ≤ ρ (D). Further, this bound is (asymptotically) tight, even for
symmetric singleton congestion games.
Recall that ρ (D) is dened as in (1) and refers to the price of anarchy of non-atomic network
congestion games with latency function in class D. We need the following lemma to prove
eorem 4.5. Its proof relies on the symmetric dierence decomposition property.
4is construction is essentially a conformal circuit decomposition, see, e.g., Onn, Rothblum, and Tangir (2005).
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Lemma 4.6. Let (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) satisfy the symmetric dierence decomposition property and let
(ce )e ∈E be arbitrary cost functions. Let f be a feasible load prole that minimizes Rosenthal’s potential
Φ(·). en for every feasible load prole д
∆( f ,д) :=
∑
e :fe>дe
( fe − дe )ce ( fe ) −
∑
e :fe<дe
(дe − fe )ce ( fe + 1) ≤ 0.
Proof. Let f be a global minimizer of Rosenthal’s potential and let д be an arbitrary feasible
load prole. en by the SDD property, there exist vectors a1, . . . ,aq such that д − f = ∑qk=1 ak
for some q. Moreover,
Φ( f ) − Φ( f + ak ) =
∑
e : ake =−1
ce ( fe ) −
∑
e : ake =1
ce ( fe + 1) ≤ 0
for all k = 1, . . . ,q, where the inequality holds because f minimizes Rosenthal’s potential Φ. By
adding up these inequalities for all k = 1, . . . ,q, we obtain that ∆( f ,д) ≤ 0. To see this, note that if
e ∈ E with fe > дe then there are precisely fe − дe vectors ak with ake = −1; similarly, if e ∈ E with
дe > fe then there are precisely дe − fe vectors ak with ake = 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.5. e upper bound proof follows the same line of arguments as in (Fotakis
2010, Lemma 3). We sketch the main ideas here only and refer to (Fotakis 2010) for more details.
Let f be a minimizer of Rosenthal’s potential and д an arbitrary feasible load prole. Note that f is
a pure Nash equilibrium. It can be shown that
C ( f ) ≤ C (д) + β (D)C ( f ) +
∑
e :fe>дe
( fe − дe )ce ( fe ) −
∑
e :fe<дe
(дe − fe )ce ( fe + 1).
By Lemma 4.6, the sum dierence ∆( f ,д) is non-negative. By rearranging terms, we obtain
C ( f )/C (д) ≤ (1 − β (D))−1 = ρ (D), which establishes the upper bound. e proof that this bound
is tight will be given in the full version of the paper. 
5 MINIMIZING ROSENTHAL’S POTENTIAL
Del Pia, Ferris, and Michini (2017) introduce an aggregation/decomposition method for computing a
global minimum of Rosenthal’s potential. It consists of two phases: In the aggregation phase, we
nd a feasible load prole f ∗ minimizing Rosenthal’s potential. In the decomposition phase, f ∗ is
then decomposed into a feasible strategy prole. e authors provide an aggregation approach
(detailed below) that works for totally unimodular matrices A and one common vector b = bi for
all i ∈ N . Here we extend this result to aggregation polytopes PN that have a box-TDI description.
Recall from Proposition 3.1 that if the aggregation polytope PN of a polytopal congestion game
has the integer decomposition property, then the feasible load proles correspond to the integral
vectors of PN . As a result, the problem we need to solve in the aggregation phase is equivalent to
(Z ) min
∑
e ∈E
fe∑
k=1
c j (k ) s.t. f ∈ PN ∩ Zm
Note that this formulation is not a linear program in the variables ( fe )e ∈E . As in the approach
of Del Pia et al. (2017), this problem can be resolved by introducing binary variables hkj ∈ {0, 1}
for k = 1, . . . ,n and j = 1, . . . ,m. e interpretation is that hkj = 1 if at least k players are using
resource j ∈ E, and hkj = 0 otherwise. In particular, if the cost functions (ce )e ∈E are non-decreasing,
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then the aggregation problem (Z ) is equivalent to the problem (R) stated below:
(R) min
m∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
c j (k )h
k
j
s.t. [A,A, . . . ,A](h11, . . . ,h1m ,h21, . . . ,h2m , . . . ,hn1 , . . . ,hnm )T ≤
∑
i ∈N bi (5)
hkj ∈ {0, 1} ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, j = 1, . . . ,m (6)
e equivalence of (Z ) and (R) follows from the following observations: If f = ( f1, . . . , fm ) ∈
PN ∩Zm is optimal for (Z ), we dene hkj = 1 for k = 1, . . . , fj and hkj = 0 for k = fj + 1, . . . ,n. e
resulting solution h = (hkj ) is feasible for (R). Similarly, if h = (hkj ) is an optimal solution for (R),
then the vector f dened by fj =
∑n
k=1 h
k
j is feasible for (Z ). Note that here we implicitly exploit
that the cost functions are non-decreasing.
We show that the integer program (R) can be solved eciently for box-TDI aggregation polytopes.
Lemma 5.1. If PN has a box-TDI description and A is a {0,±1}-matrix, then (R) can be solved in
time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi ) and the complexity of a separation oracle of PN .
Proof. Dene A′ = [A,A, . . . ,A] ∈ Zr×mn and h = (hkj ) ∈ Qmn . e relaxation of the integral
system (5) and (6) can then be wrien as the system A′h ≤ ∑i bi , 0 ≤ h ≤ 1. Let QN = {h : A′h ≤∑
i bi , 0 ≤ h ≤ 1} be the polytope described by this system.
We rst show that QN is integral. By assumption the description of PN = { f : Af ≤ ∑i ∈N bi } is
box-TDI. In particular, by applying Proposition 2.1(iv) repeatedly, we obtain that the system
[A,A, . . . ,A](h11, . . . ,h1m ,h21, . . . ,h2m , . . . ,hn1 , . . . ,hnm )T ≤
∑
i ∈N bi
is box-TDI as well. In particular, this implies that the system A′h ≤ ∑i bi , 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 is TDI because
the intersection of a box-TDI system with an arbitrary box yields a TDI system. Because ∑i bi and
the restrictions on h are integral vectors, we conclude that QN is indeed integral.
We now show how to construct a separation oracle for QN from a separation oracle for PN . For
h = (h11, . . . ,h
1
m ,h
2
1, . . . ,h
2
m , . . . ,h
n
1 , . . . ,h
n
m ) ∈ Qmn , let the aggregated vector f ∈ Qm be dened
as fj =
∑n
k=1 h
k
j for j = 1, . . . ,m. en h ∈ QN if and only if f ∈ PN . We now give a separation
oracle for QN . Let y = (ykj ) ∈ Qmn be an arbitrary rational vector and let f be dened as above.
We use the separation oracle of PN to check if f ∈ PN or not. If f ∈ PN , then also h ∈ QN and
we are done. Otherwise if f < PN the oracle returns a vector a ∈ Qm such that aTx < aT f for all
x ∈ PN . In particular this means that (aT,aT, . . . ,aT)z < (aT,aT, . . . ,aT)y for all z = (zkj ) ∈ QN .
us, we obtain a separation oracle for QN .
We now conclude the proof with a running-time analysis. From the claims above, it follows that
we can eciently solve (R) with the ellipsoid method. In particular, by (Schrijver 1986, Corollary
14.1a) this can be done in time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi ), size(ce ) for e ∈ E, and the running
time of the separation oracle for PN . Frank and Tardos (1987) show that for every linear program
max{cTx : Ax ≤ b} with a {0,±1}-matrix A, the objective function c can be replaced by an objective
function c ′, which is polynomially bounded inm, that yields the same set of optimal solutions. e
function c ′ can be computed in strongly polynomial time. is concludes the proof. 
We obtain the following main result from the discussion above.
Theorem 5.2 (Aggregation). Let Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ) be a polytopal congestion game
with aggregation polytope PN that satises the IDP and has a box-TDI description. en a feasible
load prole minimizing Rosenthal’s potential can be computed in time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi )
and the complexity of a separation oracle of PN .
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For symmetric polytopal congestion games we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3. Let Γ = (N ,E,S, (ce )e ∈E ) be a symmetric polytopal congestion game given by P .
If P satises the IDP and has a box-TDI description, then a feasible load prole minimizing Rosenthal’s
potential can be computed in time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi ), and the complexity of a separation
oracle of P .
To the best of our knowledge, there is no universal algorithm that can perform integer decom-
position of an arbitrary polytope satisfying the IDP in time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi ) and
the complexity of a separation oracle. However, under a slightly stronger integer decomposition
property such a decomposition can be done as explained below. Here we focus on symmetric
congestion games for clarity; but these arguments can be extended to the non-symmetric case as
well (details will be given in the full version of the paper).
We say that a polytope P satises the middle integral decomposition property (McDiarmid 1983)
if for n ∈ N and w ∈ Zm , the polytope P ∩ (w − (n − 1)P ) is integral. If this property is satised,
the decomposition algorithm of Baum and Troer (1978) can then be used to perform the integer
decomposition; details are given in the proof of eorem 5.4.
Theorem 5.4 (Aggregation/Decomposition). Let Γ = (N ,E,S, (ce )e ∈E ) be a symmetric poly-
topal congestion game given by P . If P satises the middle integral decomposition property and has a
box-TDI description, then a feasible strategy prole minimizing Rosenthal’s potential can be computed
in time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi ) and the complexity of a separation oracle of P .
We remark that all results in this section also hold for computing a social optimum of congestion
games with weakly convex cost functions, since this problem can be reduced to computing a global
optimum of Rosenthal’s potential (see (Del Pia et al. 2017)).
6 APPLICATIONS
We now give examples of polytopal tuples (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N ) for which the aggregation polytope
has the IDP (or middle integral decomposition property), a box-TDI description and an ecient
separation oracle. As a consequence, our results on the price of stability (eorem 4.5) and the
computation of Rosenthal’s potential minimizer (eorem 5.2 and Corollary 5.3) apply.
6.1 Symmetric totally unimodular congestion games
Totally unimodular congestion games (Del Pia et al. 2017) capture a wide range of combinatorial
congestion games. Here the common strategy set of the players is described by a polytope P =
{x : Ax ≤ b} with a totally unimodular r ×m-matrix A and an integral vector b. In particular,
such a system satises the IDP and is box-TDI. e integer decomposition property was shown by
Baum and Troer (1978). We argue that the system is box-TDI. e constraint matrix describing
the intersection of P with {x : c ≤ x ≤ d } for c,d ∈ Qm is again totally unimodular (Veino and
Dantzig 1968). Any totally unimodular system is TDI (see, e.g., (Schrijver 1986, Section 22.1)), and
therefore the system Ax ≤ b, c ≤ x ≤ d is TDI. We conclude that the system Ax ≤ b is box-TDI. If,
as in (Del Pia et al. 2017), the parameter r is considered as part of the input size as well, then there
is a trivial (strongly) polynomial separation oracle that simply checks all inequalities of the system
Ax ≤ b. For all combinatorial applications given in (Del Pia et al. 2017), the parameter r is actually
polynomially bounded in n andm, so then this assumption is justied.
6.2 Common source network congestion games
In a common source network congestion game we are given a directed graph G = (V ,A) and a
source s ∈ V . e strategy set of player i ∈ N is the set of all directed s, ti -paths for some ti ∈ V .
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Ackermann et al. (2008) already showed that one can compute a global optimum of Rosenthal’s
potential function for these games. We outline how this case can be cast in our framework. e
strategies of player i can be described by a polytope Pi = {x : Ax = bi , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}, where A is
the arc-incidence matrix of the network G, and b is the vector with (bi )s = 1, (bi )ti = −1 and zero
otherwise.5 e aggregation polytope is then PN = {y : Ay = ∑i ∈N bi , 0 ≤ y ≤ n}. Any feasible
load prole minimizing Rosenthal’s potential can be decomposed into a feasible strategy prole,
using a similar argument as in (Ackermann et al. 2008). Further, the describing system of PN is
totally unimodular and thus box-TDI.
6.3 Symmetric matroid intersection congestion games
In symmetric matroid intersection congestion games the (symmetric) strategy set of all players is
given by the common bases of two matroidsM1 = (E,I1) andM2 = (E,I2) over a common element
set E. e polytope P of the players corresponds to the common base polytope PM1,M2 as dened
in (2). e describing system of P is box-TDI (see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 41.12e)). Further,
as noted in the preliminaries there is a separation oracle for P (and thus PN ) which runs in time
polynomial in |E | and the complexity of the independence oracles forM1 andM2. However, it is
not precisely known for which cases of matroid intersection the integer decomposition property
holds.
Example 6.1 (r -Arborescences). Let D = (V ,A) be a directed graph. An r -arboresence in D is a
directed spanning tree rooted in r ∈ V . e set of all r -arboresences can be seen as the set of
common bases of two matroids. e rst matroidM1 is the graphic matroid on the undirected graph
D ′ = (V ,A′), where A′ is the set formed by replacing every directed arc in A with its undirected
version, i.e., A′ = {{u,v} : (u,v ) ∈ A}. e second matroidM2 is the partition matroid in which
independent sets are given by sets of arcs for which there is at most one incoming arc at every
node v , r (we assume there are no incoming arcs at r ). us, the common base polytope PM1,M2
describes the arborescences of D and we let P = PM1,M2 .
We argue that there is a strongly polynomial time algorithm for computing a minimum of
Rosenthal’s potential. First note that the describing system of PM1,M2 is box-TDI (see (Schrijver
2003, Corollary 41.12e)). Also, PM1,M2 satises the integer decomposition property, which follows
from Edmonds’ Disjoint Arborescences eorem (Edmonds 2003). By Corollary 5.3, we can compute
a minimum of Rosenthal’s potential in time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi ) and the complexity of a
separation oracle for PM1,M2 . e elements of the vector b are bounded by |E |, by the denition of
the rank functions. Moreover, it is not hard to see that there exist independence oracles for both
M1 andM2 that run in time polynomial in m. ese oracles can be used for separation oracles
as described in the preliminaries. It is not hard to see that if both base matroid polytopes have a
polynomial time separation oracle, then the intersection of these polytopes has one too. is shows
that there is an algorithm for computing an optimal feasible load prole in time polynomial in n
and m. Integer decomposition can also be done in time polynomial in n and m (see, e.g., (Harks
et al. 2013, eorem 5)).
Example 6.2 (Intersection of strongly base-orderable matroids). A matroidM = (E,I) is strongly
base-orderable if for every pair of bases B1,B2 ∈ B there exists a bijection τ : B1 → B2 such that
for every X ⊆ B1, we have B1 − X + τ (X ) ∈ B. As in the previous example, a box-TDI description
follows from (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 41.12e). It is also known that the independent set polytope
5Technically, this polytope can also contain paths with a nite number of disjoint cycles, but these can always be removed
in the end.
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of the intersection of strongly base-orderable matroids has the integer decomposition property
(McDiarmid 1983, eorem 5.1).6
6.4 Non-symmetric matroid congestion games
In a non-symmetric matroid congestion game Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E , the strategy set of player
i is given by the bases Bi of a matroidMi = (E,Ii ) for i ∈ N .7 e incidence vectors of the bases
of Bi can be described by the base matroid polytope
Pi = {x : x (A) ≤ ri (A),A ⊆ E, x (E) = ri (E), x ≥ 0}
as introduced in the preliminaries. at is, for every player we have a polytope of the form
Pi = {x : Ax ≤ bi ,x ≥ 0} where bi is the rank function ri of the matroidMi . In particular, it
follows that the aggregation polytope is given by
PN = {y : y (A) ≤ ∑i ri (A),A ⊆ E, y (E) = ∑i ri (E), y ≥ 0}.
e polytope PN has a box-TDI description, which follows from (Schrijver 2003, eorem 46.2).8
e integer decomposition property is also satised (see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 46.2c)).
Using similar arguments as for r -arborescences, we can thus derive a strongly polynomial time
algorithm to compute a minimum of Rosenthal’s potential.
We also derive a result that is of independent interest: We can give a combinatorial approach for
computing the symmetric dierence decomposition (which is of a specic form) of non-symmetric
matroid congestion games. Our analysis also gives rise to a strongly polynomial time local search
algorithm that computes a global optimum of Rosenthal’s potential function. is local search
algorithm can be seen as a natural generalization of best-response dynamics. e details regarding
these results will be given in the full version of the paper.
7 BOTTLENECK CONGESTION GAMES.
A boleneck congestion game Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ) is dened similar as a congestion game,
with the only dierence that the objective of a player is to minimize the maximum (rather than
the aggregated) congestion over all resources that she occupies. Formally, the cost of player i ∈ N
under strategy prole s = (s1, . . . , sn ) is given by Ci (s ) = maxe ∈si ce (xe ).
Harks, Hoefer, Klimm, and Skopalik (2013) give a dual greedy algorithm to compute a strong
equilibrium, which uses a strategy packing oracle as a subroutine. ey give ecient packing
oracles for symmetric network congestion games, non-symmetric matroid congestion games, and
(a slight generalization of) r -arborescences. In particular, this leads to polynomial time algorithms
for computing a strong equilibrium in these cases.
We adapt the algorithm in (Harks et al. 2013) to compute a load prole of a strong equilibrium
for boleneck polytopal congestion games satisfying the IDP and box-TDI property.
Theorem 7.1 (Aggregation). Let Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ) be a polytopal boleneck congestion
game with aggregation polytope PN that satises the IDP and has a box-TDI description. en there
is an algorithm for computing a load prole of a strong equilibrium in time polynomial in n, m,
size(∑i bi ) and the complexity of a separation oracle of PN .
6is also implies that the common base polytope has the integer decomposition property, since the integer decomposition
property is preserved if we restrict ourselves to a face of a polytope with the integer decomposition property.
7Our framework also captures the independent set congestion games studied by Del Pia et al. (2017). However, we mainly
focus on non-negative cost functions here (because of the ineciency measures) and then these games are trivial.
8To see this, we use the fact that the rank function is submodular and that the sum of submodular functions is again
submodular. We can then apply eorem 46.2 in (Schrijver 2003).
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ALGORITHM 1: Load prole-dual greedy algorithm.
Input :Boleneck congestion game Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ), load prole oracle O
Output :Load prole of strong equilibrium of Γ.
set N ′ = N , ue = n for all e ∈ E, T = ∅, L = E and a = O(T ∪ L, (ue )e ∈E );
while e ∈ L : ue > 0 , ∅ do
choose e ′ ∈ argmaxe ∈L:ue>0{ce (ue )}
ue ′ := ue ′ − 1;
if O(T ∪ L, (ue )e ∈E ) = NO then
ue ′ := ue ′ + 1;
L = L \ e ′, T = T ∪ {e ′}
end
a = O(T ∪ L, (ue )e ∈E )
end
return (ue )e ∈E ;
We adapt the denition of the strategy packing oracle of Harks et al. (2013) to load proles:
Load profile oracle
Input: nite set of resources E = T ∪ L with upper bounds (ue )e ∈E and n collections
S1, . . . ,Sn ⊆ 2E (given implicitly by a certain combinatorial property)
Output: yes, if there exists a feasible load prole f such that fe = ue for all e ∈ T and fe ≤ ue
for all e ∈ L; no otherwise.
Our adaptation of the dual greedy algorithm in (Harks et al. 2013) is given in Algorithm 1.
Although the ideas are similar to the ones in (Harks et al. 2013), our algorithm only works with
load proles; in particular, we do not have to explicitly compute decompositions of feasible load
proles in intermediate steps of the algorithm (which signicantly improves the running time).
Our algorithm works roughly as follows. We start with capacities of n on every resource. In
every step we pick a resource e ′ ∈ L with maximum cost among all resources that are called loose,
and check whether there is a feasible load prole if we reduce the capacity on e ′ by one. If this is
not possible, we remove e ′ from L and add e ′ to the set T of so-called tight resources. Note that
aer the algorithm has terminated, all resources are in the set T .
Proof of Theorem 7.1. It can be shown that Algorithm 1 computes a load prole of a strong
equilibrium (details will be given in the full version of the paper). It is clear that Algorithm 1 can
be executed in time polynomial in n,m and the complexity of a load prole oracle. We now give
an ecient load prole oracle, based on a separation oracle of PN . From the fact that PN has a
box-TDI description, it follows that the polytope
{y : Ay ≤ ∑i ∈N bi } ∩ {ye = ue : e ∈ T } ∩ {0 ≤ ye ≤ ue : e ∈ L}
is integral. We can then use a separation oracle for PN to nd an integral vector in this polytope in
time polynomial in n,m, size(∑i bi ) and the complexity of the separation oracle. is concludes
the proof. 
Once we have obtained the feasible load prole, we can use an integer decomposition algorithm
to nd the corresponding strategies of the players. If the integer decomposition can be done within
the same time bounds as in eorem 7.1, we obtain a (strongly) polynomial algorithm for computing
a strong equilibrium in a polytopal boleneck congestion game. In particular, this applies to all
applications mentioned in Section 6.
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For matroid boleneck congestion games, we can also derive an upper bound on the strong price
of stability (SPOS). e proof of the following result essentially relies on the fact that Algorithm 1
actually also calculates a global optimum of Rosenthal’s potential in the case of matroid boleneck
congestion games.
Corollary 7.2 (Strong price of stability). Let Γ = (N ,E, (Si )i ∈N , (ce )e ∈E ) be a matroid
boleneck congestion game with cost functions in class D. en SPOS(Γ) ≤ ρ (D).
Acknowledgements. We thank Carla Groenland, Bart de Keijzer and Daniel Dadush for helpful
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